For most of the past two years, the scarce input for AI was chips. Increasingly it is electricity. Companies can order GPUs, but they cannot easily get a few hundred megawatts of grid power delivered to a site, and the wait for a new grid connection in many US regions now runs for years. That is why data center deals are announced in gigawatts, why tech companies are signing contracts to restart nuclear plants, and why some sites are building their own gas turbines.

The CHIPS and Science Act, signed in August 2022, set aside $52.7 billion for US semiconductors, including $39 billion in manufacturing incentives run by the Commerce Department’s CHIPS Program Office. Those incentives pay for new fabs, packaging plants and suppliers of wafers, gases and equipment, mostly as direct grants, sometimes with loans. Most of the big awards were finalized in the last months of the Biden administration. The Trump administration kept the programme but changed how it works, most visibly by turning Intel’s grants into a government shareholding.

CoWoS (Chip-on-Wafer-on-Substrate) is TSMC’s method for placing a large processor and several stacks of high bandwidth memory side by side on a shared slab of silicon wiring, then mounting that slab on a package substrate. Almost every leading AI accelerator is built this way: Nvidia’s Blackwell and Rubin GPUs, AMD’s Instinct chips, Google’s TPUs and most custom chips designed with Broadcom or Marvell. For the past three years the number of CoWoS wafers TSMC could process each month has capped how many of those chips could ship, more often than the supply of leading-edge wafers did.

The US can block exports of American chipmaking tools, but it does not make all the tools that matter. The world’s only maker of EUV lithography machines is ASML in the Netherlands. Japan’s Tokyo Electron is a top supplier of the coating, etching and deposition systems found in every advanced fab. Without the Netherlands and Japan on board, US equipment controls on China would leak badly. Both countries did sign on, starting in 2023.

Hybrid bonding joins two chips by pressing their polished faces together so that copper pads on one fuse directly with copper pads on the other. There is no solder, no bump and no gap. The name comes from the two bonds made at once: the insulating surfaces stick to each other, and the embedded copper pads weld into continuous metal. Because nothing sits between the dies, connections can be packed far closer together than solder allows, and stacks get thinner and cooler.

A maritime chokepoint is a narrow passage that a large share of seaborne trade has to pass through because the alternatives are much longer or don’t exist. Five matter most to world trade: the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca and the Panama Canal. They differ a lot. Hormuz is about energy, Malacca about sheer volume, Suez and the Bab el-Mandeb work as one Europe-Asia corridor, and Panama is a freshwater-fed canal that fails in droughts.

A neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnet is the strongest permanent magnet you can buy at scale. It sits inside most electric vehicle motors, many wind turbines, missile guidance fins, drones, hard drives and phone speakers. Getting one made takes four separate industrial steps: mining the ore, separating it into individual rare earth oxides, turning those oxides into metal and alloy, then pressing and sintering the alloy into a finished magnet. China leads every one of those steps, and its lead gets bigger the further down the chain you go.

Since 2023 China has built a licensing system around the minerals and metals it dominates. The controls started with gallium and germanium and now cover rare earths, graphite, battery materials and the technology used to process them. This page lists each measure by date, notes what is suspended and what still applies, and gives a status table at the end. Last updated: 15 September 2026. Why these minerals matter China leads in refining for most strategic minerals.

A laptop review is not usually a memory-cycle datapoint. This one is. The Framework Laptop 13 Pro drew strong marks for performance, build quality, and keyboard, and was marked down on a single dimension — it is expensive, and the review attributes that expense to high RAM prices. That sentence is the cleanest publicly visible evidence to date that high-bandwidth memory wafer allocation has stopped being a datacenter accounting problem and started setting bills of materials on consumer hardware.

NVIDIA and Corning Incorporated have announced a multiyear partnership to scale U.S.-based optical connectivity manufacturing for AI infrastructure. The deal commits Corning to a tenfold expansion of its domestic optical connectivity manufacturing capacity, a greater than 50% increase in U.S. fiber production, and the construction of three new facilities across North Carolina and Texas — creating more than 3,000 jobs in the process. To understand why this matters, it helps to understand what optical connectivity actually is and where it sits in the AI infrastructure stack.

A working reference for the vocabulary of transportation — organized by mode and domain. Definitions cover infrastructure, operations, policy, and emerging mobility, written for industry professionals, planners, journalists, and analysts. Fundamentals Mode A specific form of transportation defined by the infrastructure and vehicle type it uses — road, rail, air, water, pipeline. Modal choice involves trade-offs between speed, cost, capacity, and environmental impact. Modal shift — moving freight or passengers from one mode to another — is a primary lever of transportation policy.